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The belief held by some schools of thought that 
planning and the preservation of democratic free-
doms are antagonistic has been refuted by a number 
of postwar capitalist economies. Their rejection of 
this argument would seem to have been based less on 
ideological grounds than on their need to achieve a 
degree of social, structural and spatial balance in the 
distribution of resources. In contrast, meanwhile, to 
the imperative character of planning in the con-
trolled economies, the State has given an indicative 
orientation to planning in the market economies. 
For reasons which are detailed in the first part 
of the article, the author argues that although the 
State plays an important role in planning, its actions 
have been restricted, primarily, by the introduction 
of significant changes in the structure of production. 
First and foremost among these changes has been 
the shift away from the small-scale national enter-
prises which predominated ¡n the 1950s and 1960s 
and towards the large multinational corporations 
which made their appearance in the 1970s. 
Based on an analysis of monetary and fiscal 
policies' effects on some European economies, the 
author defines the content of the arguments for and 
against indicative planning. The central part of the 
article, however, is based on a detailed examination 
of planning in France. The author first seeks to 
clarify the content and significance of capitalist plan-
ning experiences and then goes on to propose a 
number of guidelines designed to ensure a continu-
ing role for planning in societies aspiring to higher 
levels of democracy. 
•Member of the House of Commons, London, the 
United Kingdom. 
In the paradigm of Friedrich von Hayek, "plan" 
is very much a four-letter word. He polarizes the 
distinction between plan and market and 
assumes that the pursuit of any form of planning 
in a modern capitalist economy will lead directly 
to the Gulag Archipelago and the suspension of 
democratic liberties. 
This argument was rejected by several Euro-
pean economies, as well as Japan, during most of 
the period following the Second World War. It 
was rejected less on theoretical or ideological 
grounds than in terms of the practical difficulties 
of offsetting major disproportions among differ-
ent sectors, regions and social classes within 
society and the need to achieve a degree of social, 
structural and spatial balance in the distribution 
of resources. 
The role of the State as planner can be ana-
lysed in other terms. In contrast with the wholly 
imperative or would-be imperative operations 
of the State as planner in controlled economies, 
planning in the Western market economy since 
the war has typically been indicative, combined 
with mechanisms exhorting private capital to 
fulfil its potential growth rate in order to raise 
both profit expectations and the actual growth 
rate of the economy. 
Planners, like demand managers, were well 
aware of the significance of such an expansion of 
the domestic economy for the balance of trade. 
However, in countries such as France, Italy and 
the United Kingdom they were especially con-
cerned with problems relating to the structure of 
trade rather than simply with its level in terms 
of demand management. They sought to identify 
those sectors or areas of the economy with a high 
import propensity and, conversely, those sectors 
where export potential was strong. This in turn 
involved them in questions of the structure of 
economic activity, especially in regard to those 
sectors or forms which had a considerable influ-
ence on the rate of growth of the economy as a 
whole and on the trade balance. This preoccupa-
tion with the trade structure of the economy was 
related to the planners' concern with the social 
and spatial distribution of activity. 
In other words, national planners in coun-
tries such as France, Belgium, Italy and the Uni-
ted Kingdom in the 1950s and 1960s were 
especially concerned with the generation of suf-
ficient resources to permit an increasing expen-
diture in the social sectors of the economy as well 
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as either to offset the increasing disparities in 
product, income and employment among differ-
ent regions of the economy or to bring about a 
convergence of these levels among different 
regional and urban areas. In the 1970s, as key 
urban areas entered into economic crisis, there 
was increased concern with urban and especially 
inner-city policy in both the United States and 
Europe. It is now understood that the relation 
among the social, sectoral and spatial distribu-
tion of resources depends not only upon the role 
of the State within society but also upon the 
extent to which it is possible for any government 
to achieve a rise in expectations and actual 
growth to match the potential growth of the 
economy as a whole. 
It cannot be claimed that the role of the State 
as planner has been uniformly successful in 
those economies which have pursued medium-
term economic plans. In part, this reflects the 
extent to which the assumption that the State 
can establish medium-term targets for the econ-
omy has been called into question not only by 
politicians, who in many cases have been reluc-
tant to publish standards for failure or achieve-
ment in national expansion, but also by the 
degree to which the mechanisms of unequal 
competition between meso- and microeconomic 
capital and national and multinational enter-
prise have affected the feasibility of State plan-
ning at the level of individual nation-States. 
This qualification does not imply that there 
is no role for the State as planner at the national 
level. Nonetheless it has become increasingly 
clear to planners themselves that unless there is 
an international and multinational dimension to 
their activities, the degree to which they will be 
able to offset disproportion and imbalance will 
be limited, thus frustrating both planners and 
their plans. 
Part of the problem lies in the undermining 
of the Keynesian demand framework for plan-
ning policies caused by changes in the structure 
of supply. Predominantly small-scale national 
enterprise in the immediate postwar period had, 
by the 1970s, given way to the dominance of 
mesoeconomic multinational big business in 
production, distribution and trade (from the 
Greek: macros — large, micros = small, mesos = 
intermediate). This new type of large-scale 
enterprise profoundly restricted the effective-
ness of indirect Keynesian measures such as fis-
cal and monetary policy and exchange rate 
changes. In practice, this amounted to a divorce 
of the Keynesian synthesis between macro 
demand management and micro supply 
structures. 
Keynes plus planning 
By the early 1960s the conviction that it was 
necessary to supplement Keynesian demand 
management policies was also gaining ground in 
Keynes's geographical and intellectual home-
land. The United Kingdom's growth record in 
the 1950s had been uniformly lower than that of 
the continental Western European countries 
with the exception of Belgium, with recurrent 
payments deficits accompanying demand-
induced expansion. Without doubt both the Uni-
ted Kingdom and Belgium were special cases. 
Both had entered the postwar period with 
higher per capita income levels than the other 
economies concerned, which for some time could 
justifiably be said to have been catching up with 
the United Kingdom's and Belgium's income 
levels. In addition, both countries had been the 
pacemakers in the original industrial revolution 
in Western Europe and could be said to have 
suffered from over-specialization in what had by 
then become traditional or declining industries. 
Besides, both the United Kingdom and Bel-
gium had traditionally encouraged capital 
investment in the colonies at the cost of direct 
investment at home. The United Kingdom had 
also accepted long-term debt obligations during 
the war which reduced the credibility of sterling 
as a reserve currency, as well as aggravating 
pressure on the pound from bala nee-of -
payments deficits which other countries might 
have sustained in the short-term without pres-
sure for domestic deflation. A further factor may 
have been a smaller labour supply than that 
available in the fast-growing continental West-
ern European economies as a result of either 
interregional or intersectoral migration. 
However, there were additional problems 
for slow-growing economies such as those of 
Belgium and the United Kingdom which had 
already been outlined in Harrod's pioneering 
application of Keynesian analysis to economic 
growth. The emphasis in Harrod's growth mod-
els is on the rate of saving and investment and 
the capital-output ratio of the investment con-
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cerned. For a given capital-output ratio, more 
investment will mean more growth. Through 
embodied technical progress, the capital-output 
ratio also will be lowered, thus further increasing 
the rate of growth for a given savings and invest-
ment level. Both are important, however. In 
other words, while innovation will raise the 
growth potential of an economy, the flow of 
innovation itself depends upon the rate of 
investment; and this depends on entrepreneurs' 
expectations as to the likely rate of growth in 
demand for their products: in Harrod's terms, 
the "warranted" rate in the sense that it is held 
by them to warrant a given rate of investment in 
physical plant and equipment. As Harrod 
pointed out in 1939, this might well be lower 
than the growth potential of the economy as a 
whole (in Harrod's terms, the "natural" rate). 
Yet under actual conditions of slow growth, 
it is not in private companies' interest to 
increase their rate of investment over and above 
what they anticipate as the warranted growth 
rate, since this would leave them with surplus 
capacity, lower profits and a reduced market 
quotation, thereby endangering their long-term 
survival. In other words, slow growth tends to be 
self-reinforcing in the sense that when actual 
growth is slow, private interest will act in such a 
way as to keep it slow. 
Monetary and fiscal policy 
In principle this situation could be remedied 
by appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. 
Cheaper money and reduced taxation on inter-
mediate and final products should raise entre-
preneurs' expectations as regards the warranted 
growth rate and result in an increase in the 
overall rate of investment. In practice, however, 
fiscal and monetary policies alone are not 
enough. 
First, they serve more than one purpose. 
Their potential might be maximized if they were 
directed solely towards the mobilization of 
investment in given sectors, with differentiated 
interest rate concessions and tax rebates, but 
they also have to serve their traditional Keyne-
sian purpose of managing the macroeconomic 
demand level, where short-term balance-of-
payments difficulties reflecting a low rate of 
growth in long-term investment may necessitate 
deflationary monetary and fiscal policy which 
further reinforces the trend towards a low level 
of long-term investment. 
Second, long-term investment involves a 
considerable lag between conception and pro-
duction. A venture requiring an entirely new 
plant and equipment will take anything from 
two to five years for completion. The stimula-
tion of demand by fiscal policy measures may 
therefore result in demand-pull inflationary 
pressure before long-term investment has 
resulted in production to satisfy the expanded 
demand. 
Third, a succession of stop-go cycles will 
. itself work as a disincentive to demand-induced 
long-term investment, since management will 
become aware that an expansionary phase may 
be followed by deflationary policies by the time 
that the added capacity from new investment 
becomes available. Monetary policy is not more 
likely to prove effective in stimulating an 
increase in the rate of investment under such 
conditions, inasmuch as the reduction of the 
total cost of a given investment project to be 
achieved through a lower interest rate will con-
stitute a negligible proportion of the direct and 
indirect cost to the firm concerned if it is not able 
to utilize a large proportion of the capacity of the 
investment over the medium term. 
The case for planning 
In 1974 Harrod himself admitted these lim-
itations of monetary and fiscal policy and 
allowed that "free enterprise economies need 
some further weapon than monetary and fiscal 
policies if they are to function efficiently". The 
instrument that he endorsed amounted to the 
institution of indicative national planning 
already pioneered by the French, which figured 
as a major policy measure in the British National 
Plan of the following year. As Harrod argued 
with reference to his own conceptual frame-
work, such a plan should make a specific esti-
mate of the "natural" growth potential of the 
economy and should spell out its implications, 
sector by sector, to the industries concerned 
through their respective economic development 
committees. Harrod admitted that the plan: 
"should consist of more than the mere pres-
entation of growth rates to industries. The 
industries should be requested to comment 
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and, if some of the parts of the plan assigned 
to them are not feasible, the planning body 
should do a new input-output analysis in the 
light of the new information and put for-
ward a new plan well based in all its parts". 
In other words, according to Harrod, a sec-
toraily disaggregated national plan should 
attempt to inform and be informed by compan-
ies in such a way that the warranted growth rate 
rises to meet the natural growth potential of the 
economy. 
Planning in France 
For years, France was held up as the para-
digm for indicative planning in a market econ-
omy. Yet planning in postwar France started out 
with special advantages. 
First, direct government intervention in the 
economy had been a long-standing feature of the 
French State since Louis XIV and Colbert. It was 
largely accepted by the private sector as being in 
its own as well as the national interest. 
Second, planning was introduced by a tho-
roughly exceptional individual —Jean 
Monnet— and in the exceptional circumstances 
of postwar reconstruction, when private enter-
prise was particulary anxious to co-operate with 
a clear central initiative for co-ordinating the 
recovery from the war. 
Third, it was accompanied by a major reform 
of the administrative civil service and the estab-
lishment of a new training school for top recruits 
to that service —the Ecole Nationale 
d'Administration— which from the beginning 
taught and largely gained acceptance for the new 
planning process. 
Fourth, French planning was not merely 
indicative. Its success depended not only on the 
statement of sectoral targets in the manner 
recommended by Harrod, but also on direct lev-
erage on mesoeconomic companies, combining 
"sticks" (especially price controls) with "car-
rots" (concessionary grants and aid). 
Fifth, the "feedback" effects of planning 
itself were considerable. In simple terms, when 
actual growth is high, indicative planning is 
likely to prove more effective than when growth 
is slow inasmuch as the stated growth targets 
will appear more credible to private enterprises. 
Indeed, after the war —and in contrast with the 
anti-planning claims of Hayek and Friedman 
and others— the French economy rapidly 
achieved a GNP growth rate of over 4% per 
annum, rising to over 5% per annum in the 
1960s. 
Cause or effect? 
What, then, is the balance of judgement on 
the French model of indicative planning? 
According to Vera Lutz (Lutz, 1969): "French 
planning never had worked in France —nor 
could have worked there or anywhere else— as a 
largely 'non-interventionist' form of integral 
central planning. It had always worked only as 
partial and interventionist planning. As such it 
had been not dissimilar, if we disregard a special 
attachment to price controls and certainly spe-
cially French techniques of intervention, from 
that engaged in by other 'Western countries'." 
More brutally, Jacques Rueff compared the 
French planners with "the cocks who crowed 
and thought they brought on the dawn". 
However, in contrast with Lut2's claim, 
French planning neither was nor sought to be 
wholly imperative. Andrew Shonfield described 
the position well when he said that part of its 
success lay in the extent to which it was "more 
than indicative - less than imperative" (Shon-
field, 1975). For many of the French —as in 
postwar Italy— planning was seen as a social and 
political process by which both present and 
future problems —unresolved by the market 
mechanism— could be identified and at least 
offset, if not remedied. 
Contrary to Rueff's claim, most of those in 
leading roles in politics, trade unions, business or 
government in France were aware that for half a 
century the French Economy had been gripped 
by a chronic Malthusianism. Output growth was 
low in France for several years before the First 
World War, but postwar recovery after 1918 was 
hesitant and uncertain. France did not achieve its 
pre-First World War output level again until 
1929, after which it fell with the Depression. It 
only recovered its 1929 level in 1939. By con-
trast, the 1939 level of output —during the First 
French Plan— was re-achieved as early as 1948 
and increased thereafter at a compound rate of 
growth of 4% per annum through the 1950s, 
rising to 5.5% per annum in the 1960s. 
This was the period during which France 
was literally transformed from a relatively 
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underdeveloped pre-industrial system to a mod-
ern industrial economy. Labour markets were 
able to draw upon reserves from agriculture, 
reducing the proportion of the French working 
population in agriculture from a third to less 
than a tenth over a period of some 30 years, but 
such a transformation would not have been pos-
sible without the demand pull for labour from 
new investment as well as the migration push of 
those whose rising social expectations made 
them less willing than their forebears to take up 
jobs "on the farm". 
The justification for planning 
The importance of the planning process in 
raising expectations of economic growth (align-
ing the "warranted" rate with a higher natural or 
"potential" economic growth rate) should not be 
underestimated. The social psychology of the 
process is important. As the key Planning Com-
missioner for the 1960s, Pierre Masse, put it, 
indicative plans tended to be self-implementing 
inasmuch as they revealed a consistent pattern of 
future demands and supplies to market partici-
pants. The fact that targets as published by the 
planners were either over- or under-achieved in 
particular sectors was less important than the 
awareness on the part of the main social and 
economic actors in the system that buyers and 
suppliers, competitors and colleagues, were all 
assuming that an expansion was taking place. As 
the title of Masse's own book The Plan or Anti-
Hazard (Pierre Masse, Le Plan ou L'Anti-
Hazard) makes plain, risks were reduced by the 
collective social process of planning. 
A State loan policy for industry is more effi-
cient at such times than when growth is slow, 
because management will be more confident of a 
market for its products. Moreover, it will be 
penalized if it does not maintain a high rate of 
investment since it will then risk loss of market 
share to other firms. Therefore, less imperative 
measures need to be taken to ensure that particu-
lar production or import bottlenecks are 
widened, and planners can concern themselves 
with adjusting the pattern and structure of 
growth rather than undertaking the more Her-
culean effort of promoting it in the first place. 
Given the constraints on the powers of co-
ordination and initiative of given planning staff, 
the less there is to do the more effective ¡t can be. 
If such success was seen to the Left, Right 
and Centre during the first four plans in France 
(up to 1965), why the reduced success from the 
mid-1960s onwards? One reason was precisely 
the difficulty in gaining a social consensus with 
respect to employment, inflation and public-
spending targets. Another was the beginning of 
a conflict between prestige, high technology and 
military spending and the social objectives of the 
plan itself. At the end of 1965 when the Fifth 
French Plan (for 1966-1970) was being dis-
cussed in parliament, a leading official of the 
Plan advised that one should not be too 
impressed by its objectives for housing, health, 
social expenditure, employment and income. In 
his view it was inconceivable that France could 
achieve these social and economic aims within 
the Plan while also allocating resources to an 
independent nuclear deterrent (l'Arme 
Nucleare), a supersonic aircraft and rocket deliv-
ery system (Force de Frappe and the Diamant 
programme), a related major computer system 
—at a time when the United States would not 
allow France the use of major IBM systems (Plan 
Calcul), and high-prestige technology projects 
such as the Concorde and a civil nuclear energy 
programme. As the official put it, "this circle 
cannot be squared. I anticipate grave social ten-
sions" (Saingeour, 1965). 
The grave social tensions hit the streets of 
Paris two and one-half years later in May 1968. 
Due in Jarge part to a failure to resolve raised 
expectations within French society, the "events 
of May" can be seen not only as a rejection by a 
new breed of young people of the technocratic 
roles assigned to them in a paternalist society, 
but also —in part— as the result of the success 
rather than failure of the new planning process, 
which had given such a degree of coherence to 
the sustained economic expansion since the war. 
In other words, rather than Rueffs cocks crow-
ing and bringing the dawn, the very success of 
planning within the system raised political 
expectations, especially at the level of a very 
powerful Presidency of the Republic (De 
Gaulle), that "the chicken could lay golden eggs". 
Certainly it is clear that social tensions and 
the need to meet frustrated expectations in 
terms of housing, health and education systems 
became a priority for the Plan from the late 
1960s onwards. However, the wage settlements 
of Grenelle through which De Gaulle, in the 
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autumn of 1968, isolated the student revolt by 
coming to terms with the trade unions largely 
pre-empted the resources available for increased 
social expenditure. 
Planning called into question 
Thus, in the early 1960s, just when French 
planning was being exported abroad, it was dec-
lining in effectiveness in France. In the words of 
Jacques Delors, this was "because the French 
were thinking of other things, because they were 
seized by the throat by inflation and were in 
major balance of payments deficit. At that stage, 
the Plan was not even debated by parliament. 
For planners, it was the crossing of a desert. 
During this period they turned their attentions 
to improving their techniques while waiting for 
better days" (Delors, 1978). 
In these respects the failure to involve the 
trade unions in a planning process which went 
beyond traditional wage bargaining, as well as 
the challenge by social and class forces to the 
resources claimed by the Plan, threw planning 
into question. 
International pressures 
As Delors stressed, in France the opening up 
of the economy to the exterior and its increased 
internationalization related both to the decision 
to join the Common Market of the European 
Economic Community and to the greater 
emphasis given to market forces in general 
rather than to planning. Both factors were 
accompanied by "reforms", but these involved a 
paradox. The proposed planning reforms 
entailed changes that weakened planning itself. 
For one thing, indirect reliance on the market 
mechanism reduced the direct decision-making 
role of planners and restricted them to the for-
mulation of sectoral plans. Furthermore, macro-
economic policy was increasingly being pursued 
outside the planning framework and the key 
macroeconomic variables relating to the budget, 
prices and credit no longer were integrated into 
the planning process. 
The result in France, Delors argued, was a 
period of exacerbated social tension. After a 
period of relative calm, the explosion of May 
1968 revealed the contradiction between a pri-
vate liberal mode of development and the 
increasing social needs of the system. A class 
struggle was taking place which had three main 
dimensions: the struggle for the redistribution 
of income, for better conditions of work and for 
the exercise of economic power. If there had 
been this alone, the government might have 
coped. However, in Delors words: "there was 
another dimension within the first. This was the 
contradiction between the new ruling class that 
controlled big business and the traiditonal mid-
dle classes of farmers, shopkeepers and small 
firms. The government and conservative power 
had need of the first to assure both their policies 
and their economic prosperity. But they had an 
absolute need of the latter in order simply to stay 
in power via the vote... This was their cruel 
dilemma, trying to reconcile the traditional mid-
dle class with the view of industrialization as 
perceived by the technostructure and the new 
ruling class. The Plan was not a good means for 
them to do this since it meant transparency and 
coherence in objectives. But the dilemma could 
not be solved either through clandestine inco-
herence. The failure to resolve it resulted in 
aggravated inflation" (Delors, 1978). 
The mesoeconomic sector 
In France the mesoeconomic sector had con-
sciously been sought by policy-makers in succes-
sive plans, however unconscious they may have 
been either of the concept itself or of its conse-
quences for economic policy. With the philo-
sophy that "big is better" in international 
competition and through an awareness that 
government departments could only handle a 
small number of companies effectively through 
direct negotiation, planners had sought to estab-
lish what they called the 80:20 ratio, whereby 
80% of given markets would be commanded by 
20% of the enterprises in them. The State as 
planner sought to promote mergers. 
However, as Delors indicated, they found 
themselves faced with the question of who 
controls real resource allocation and who gains 
from planning. As French planning moved 
beyond the recovery phase, the practice of 
relying on purely indicative measures in the 
private sector was found wanting. Planning 
targets had to be accompanied by an array of 
"sweeteners" such as government contracts, 
fiscal concessions, subsidized interest rates and 
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outright grants as incentives to persuade leading 
firms to undertake what the public sector could 
be obliged to do through more imperative action. 
The formula of French planning as "imperative 
for the public sector and indicative for the 
private" —enshrined as late as 1976 by 
President Giscard D'Estaing— was in large part 
a fig leaf veiling massive public subsidization of 
the private sector. Through its apologists, such 
as Masse, French planning was seen as the co-
ordination of private enterprise in the public 
interest. In practice, however, it could well be 
seen as the public co-ordination of private 
interest, using public funds to achieve what the 
private sector had chosen to do in the first place. 
There being so few firms, the State had few 
alternatives. 
A qualification of the argument might, theo-
retically, be made in the case of price controls. 
However, general price controls may suit big 
business in the mesoeconomic sector in so far as 
it is concerned with increasing its monopolistic 
domination of particular national markets. 
When productivity deriving from gains achieved 
on the basis of size and larger-scale innovation is 
lower in big than in small business, general price 
controls squeeze the profits of small firms 
harder than those of big enterprises. Thus, State 
price controls used as a planning instrument, 
either for reasons of international competitive-
ness or as part of a contract between the State 
and organized labour, can actually operate as a 
powerful tool for the concentration and centrali-
zation of capital. 
Once concentration and the trend towards 
monopoly had proceeded apace, as was the case 
in France by the mid-1960s, capital in the 
mesoeconomic sector pressured for less price 
control and greater market freedom. It gained 
this —safe from public view— in the committee 
rooms of the Finance and Trade Directorate of 
the Ministry of Finance. One result, even before 
the commodity and oil price increases of the 
early 1970s, was strong inflationary pressure. 
In short, the planners who sought to pro-
mote big business in France were fairy godmoth-
ers rather than parents to the concentration of 
capital: they sponsored, favoured and aided a 
process occurring essentially through the market 
mechanism. The adolescent European firms 
sponsored by the planners grew to a point where 
the dominance of the economy raised a real ques-
tion as to who planned whom —whether the 
planners were acting upon the companies, or the 
companies upon the plan. 
Crisis and decline 
The Sixth Plan (1970-1975) no more fore-
saw the oil price increases which began in 1973 
than had leading economic authorities in other 
countries. The degree of relative certainty about 
the overall direction of the economy, which had 
been both apparent and well-founded between 
the late 1940s and May 1968, was fundamentally 
weakened. The relative sophistication of the 
Monnet-Masse planning process, with its sec-
toral modernization committees, its increasingly 
sophisticated econometric models and its more 
detailed forecasts, lost credibility among both 
civil servants and businessmen because of the 
increasingly uncertain world environment. The 
oil price increases of 1973 hit France especially 
hard since it depended on imported energy for 
8 5 % of its domestic economy's needs. 
As Estrin and Holmes aptly observed, the 
Seventh Plan (1975-1980) came increasingly to 
be seen as a government public relations exer-
cise. By 1975, as other leading world economies 
put on the brakes rather than adjusting their 
course following the OPEC increases, high 
unemployment hit France for the first time since 
the war. A return to full employment was one of 
the major objectives of the Seventh Plan. In 
contrast with earlier postwar plans, however, it 
failed to spell out how this could be achieved, 
while the government actually tried to obscure 
the calculations of planners who realized that 
this objective could not be met with the rela-
tively deflationary policies which the govern-
ment itself was pursuing. It was at this time that 
the Keynesian paradigm which had prevailed in 
relation to macroeconomic policy in France 
throughout the postwar period was increasingly 
being challenged by monetarists and by those 
who wished to "roll back the frontiers of the 
State" and give priority to market forces. 
In 1980, with the publication of the Eighth 
National Plan, it became clear that the pre-
socialist French government was having consid-
erable difficulties in ensuring either the basic 
generation of resources at the macroeconomic 
level or a sufficient scale of sectoral and social 
redistribution to offset the tensions created by 
unemployment in traditional industries such as 
word processing and data processing in the ser-
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vice sector headed by Simon Nora (the Nora 
Report). The Nora and Mine report anticipated 
grave social tensions not only due to the decline 
in industrial employment brought on by moder-
nization, but also because of the introduction of 
word and data processors in the service sector of 
the economy, which it estimated could result in 
the unemployment of 90% of the existing labour 
force within 20 or 30 years. Although the French 
economy had been able to sustain the process of 
industrialization during the third of a century 
which had passed since the Second World War 
by attracting the offspring of peasants and 
farmers into industry and services, the warning 
registered by Nora did not pass without notice 
either in France or abroad. 
The international context 
It is arguable that the lack of economic sover-
eignty seen in the case of the United Kingdom 
stemmed, fundamentally, from the limited 
power of indicative planning and incentives to 
harness the multinational companies which by 
then dominated half of its trade output. Italy and 
France, being less multinational, either did not 
face the same problem or did not suffer it in the 
same scale. Jean Benard and Bela Balassa have 
claimed that EEC membership undermined the 
basis of some of the key planning levels of the 
period of the Fourth Republic in France —in 
particular the threat that tariffs would be 
reduced if a leading firm would not comply with 
the planners' interpretation of the public inter-
est. However, it is not clear that the planners 
were exerting so powerful a leverage by this 
means as to justify the conclusion that EEC entry 
had gelded the planners' powers. The increased 
bargaining power of the few firms which by the 
1960s had come to dominate particular sectors of 
the economy probably also was important. By 
then, reconstructed big business in France had 
come to challenge the State's mediation between 
the public and private interest. 
A key argument is that the increasing liber-
alization of trade and payments in the Western 
world economy as a whole from the late 1950s 
onwards was an important factor in eroding the 
bargaining power of the State in relation to 
mesoeconomic capital. On the tariff side, the 
Kennedy Round was to reduce the common 
external tariff of the EEC on industrial products 
to a negligible 6% average. EEC internal tariff 
abolition only just preceded the United States 
achievement of a virtually total liberalization of 
trade. The rise of the Eurodollar market pre-
ceded the EEC monetary union with the estab-
lishment of an effective Euromoney to which 
most big businesses in most countries had free 
and easy access. The decline of the role of the 
FDES (Fund of Economic and Social Develop-
ment) in France and the KFW (Reconstruction 
Loans Corporation) in the Federal Republic of 
Germany as lenders to big business appears to 
have partially accompanied this trend. 
Fiscal crisis 
The real change in favour of capital and 
against public finance in the 1960s took the form 
of increased concern by planners and public 
authorities to ensure international competitive-
ness through export promotion under the new 
liberalization conditions. 
In the United Kingdom, the normal rates of 
corporation tax had been offset almost entirely 
by an increased scale and range of government 
rebates, allowances and investment grants to 
industry by the end of the 1960s. Since the export 
trade sector represented the manufacturing 
industries which transformed basic materials 
and energy inputs into goods for service distribu-
tion, in practice they marked failure to tax the 
productive sector of the economy effectively. 
Again, in France, much of the public hand-back 
to the private sector appears to have occurred in 
the silence of the corridors of the Ministry of 
Finance and is thus less liable to precise evalua-
tion; but in any case, taxation in France had 
tended to be more regressive and less weighted 
towards the corporate sector than in the United 
Kingdom. In Italy, there has always been more 
truth in the otherwise entertaining judgement 
that big business paid little or no tax anyway, 
keeping one set of books for the government and 
another for itself. 
To the extent that multinational capital was 
exerting an increasing influence in Western 
Europe, the technique of transfer pricing put big 
businesses operating in more than one country 
in a position to increase the nominal cost of 
imports from subsidiaries abroad in such a way 
as to minimize profits in any one country or 
group of countries where nominal taxation was 
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high, with the funds concerned frequently being 
"laundered" through tax havens. As a result, 
there was an increasing tendency associated with 
the multinational trend for those mesoeconomic 
companies which would have been liable to pay 
the most tax to pay the least or none at all. 
Inflation and planning 
In view of the fact that big business in the 
mesoeconomic sector had come to represent 
one-third of economic activity in the main econ-
omies of Western Europe by the late 1960s (e.g., 
in the EEC in 1981 one-third of the GDP was 
represented by only 140 companies), this decline 
in effective taxation posed a fiscal crisis for 
States which had come to assume that they could 
finance continually rising public expenditure 
without difficulty. In other words, the fiscal basis 
of the "Keynesian State" was substantially 
undermined. 
Increasingly, public expenditure was 
financed by borrowing rather than taxation of 
the productive sectors of the economy. The bor-
rowing costs were increasingly met by regressive 
taxation on wage earners, who responded to the 
threat to their real incomes by increased 
demands for higher nominal income. 
Higher wage costs, in turn, provided private 
capital with the grounds to claim that it could not 
afford to support State policies for restraint of 
prices. Commodity price inflation (in many cases 
representing transfer pricing by vertically-
integrated multinationals) underlay the oil price 
inflation from 1973 onwards, which onyl turned 
and re-turned the screw of an already major 
inflationary spiral. 
Inflation of the kind experienced before the 
1973 oil price rises could have been tolerated for 
some time, not only because it still was generally 
within single digits but also because it was 
accompanied by sustained growth of income at 
relatively full employment in most of the 
advanced capitalist countries in Europe. The 
post-1973 combination of inflation and reces-
sion, however, exposed the Keynesian planners 
to the crisis in capital accumulation, real income 
and profit growth. 
According to the orthodoxies which gained 
acceptance in the 1960s, relatively high levels of 
unemployment would ensure that wage 
demands were restrained, basically through 
reducing trade union bargaining power. This 
Paish-Phillips argument was burst asunder in 
the mid-1960s in the United Kingdom. In Italy, 
the combination —after two decades of separate 
action— of the three main industrial unions 
showed that this thesis relied too heavily on a 
retrospective reading of the tranquility of labour 
during the long postwar boom, as was seen when 
the hot autumn of 1968 reversed profit-wage 
imbalance and threatened further capital accum-
ulation on a major scale under private control. 
However, one factor in the combination of 
inflation and recession in the early and mid-
1970s in Western Europe appears to have lain in 
the hitherto unfelt consequences of the trend 
towards monopoly and mesoeconomic power in 
the heartland of the system. Basically, in the 
earlier and more competitive period of capital-
ism, prices tended to lead output and employ-
ment in the upturn and downturn of the trade 
cycle. In the upturn, capitalists rightly expected 
that they could command higher prices during a 
period of rising relative scarcity of inputs and 
final goods (when receipts and incomes were 
high). In the downturn, inversely, they sought to 
gain a larger share of declining markets by low-
ering prices faster than the fall in activity. 
Capitalist planning 
The previous argument suggests that: 
— Modern capitalist planning was only in part 
responsible for the bask accumulation of 
capital which occurred in Western Europe 
after the war; 
— Keynesian demand management provided a 
rationale for the process of combined public 
expenditures and private capital accumula-
tion which occurred in the Western Euro-
pean economies, rather than being its cause; 
— Indicative planning established its postwar 
reputation during the period in which it in 
fact was mainly affecting public-sector 
spending and enterprise; 
— The liberalization of trade compounded 
rather than caused the increasing imbalance 
between the economic power of mesoeco-
nomic big business and government 
planners; 
— The leading planners increasingly sought to 
go beyond macro or sectoral planning in 
relation to industrial mesoeconomic com-
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panies through voluntary or indicative 
agreements; 
— Such agreements lacked sufficient "pull" on 
mesoeconomic companies to match the 
"push" from public spending and public 
enterprise planning. 
New ends and means 
If a democratic society is to ensure the classic 
welfare ends of full employment, an equitable 
distribution of income and extensive social servi-
ces, it must gain a strategic control over the 
allocation of resources. It also must ensure that 
planning provides both new ends or objectives 
and new institutional means for their achieve-
ment. This involves a new conceptual frame-
work for the role of the economy in society, 
rather than simply an attempt —in vain— make 
the prevailing system work at higher levels of 
output and employment. Further, it means plan-
ning needs to be seen as a process of social 
negotiation towards new ends —to serve eco-
nomic needs and development— as a means of 
ensuring a democratic allocation of resources in 
the public interest. 
New ends and means for planning —as a 
process of negotiation and debate— means 
extending the democratic process into the centre 
of planning itself. This should involve an exten-
sion of parliamentary debate, based on demo-
cratic principles, beyond the mere scrutiny of 
five-year plans elaborated by technical experts 
and civil servants. If democratic negotiation and 
debate in society are to prove effective, they will 
require a new mix in what are at present 
unequally mixed economies and an extension of 
new forms of public and co-operative enter-
prises through which the public can directly 
undertake what private enterprise either cannot 
or will not fulfil. If this is not to result in an 
excessive centralization of State power, the role 
of government should be limited to strategic 
intervention, rather than covering each and 
every process of resource allocation. 
Until now, when governments have been 
faced with a crisis, they have reacted defensively, 
adopting a range of tactics assumed to cover 
their position until such time as the market 
mechanism ensures a recovery of the system. 
This reaction, whether based on cautious Keyne-
sianism or manic monetarism, offers no solution 
to the crisis. The State itself must become a 
protagonist of the new model of development, 
concerning itself more with the means and ends 
of a new social and economic order and less with 
means only designed to defend or restore the 
already outdated system of the past. 
Beyond indicative planning 
Much of the State intervention of the past 
has been called "planning". However, the plans 
in question have been secondary rather than 
primary, passive rather than active, and on 
paper rather than in the field of real politics. The 
State was called upon to set targets which it could 
not fulfil because it lacked control over strategic 
sectors and groups within the economy. It was 
called upon to salvage failing entrepreneurial 
groups, and to offset unemployment, inflation 
and the rising public deficit without either a 
strategy for the future or the means for its 
realization. 
In one sence, lacking a framework for plan-
ning as a process of social negotiation for chang-
ing options in the system, the State could not 
even simulate a working model of the future. It 
also lacked the social relations of consent neces-
sary to achieve such a scenario of the future. 
Presuming too much knowledge within the sys-
tem, it relied on changing the shape of the econ-
omy mainly through aggregate macroeconomic 
policies, leaving it to a framework of incentives 
to induce the mesoeconomic and microeconomic 
sectors to pursue the targets of the plan. 
Structural relationships within the system, 
especially within a system undergoing sweeping 
changes, were sometimes identified as problems, 
but they remained unresolved. The question of 
societal distribution, and especially the issue of 
transfers of productivity between those who are 
employed and those who are unemployed or in 
retirement, were largely ignored or postponed. 
Visible versus invisible hands 
One of the most apparent features of the 
current crisis is the failure of the "invisible hand 
of the market" lauded by its main apologists, 
including Freidman. Planning, on the other 
hand, must make its hand visible and must doso 
throughout the range of complex mechanisms 
by which power can be decentralized through the 
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market and associated sectors. Further, the vis-
ible hand of the State must be controlled by 
society through new forms of representative 
mechanisms if it is to be democratic and socialist 
rather than bureaucratic or State-capitalist. 
If the new model of development is to be 
planned, it must involve overall systematic plan-
ning as well as planning within a new system of 
social negotiation for change. Such planning 
must also move beyond the traditional formula-
tions of "indicative" versus "imperative". 
Systematic planning seeks to include within 
its framework of analysis and evaluation all 
those variables considered to be relevant to the 
planning process and articulates individual plans 
and aspirations within an overall consistent 
framework. For the instruments of democratic 
planning are plans —in the plural— while the 
validity of planning líes in its ability to give 
coherence to individual aspirations which other-
wise, through the workings of the market, would 
either be incoherent or would remain 
unachieved. The planning process must also 
provide a means by which sectoral, social and 
spatial (regional-urban) plans can be reconciled 
within a given national framework. 
Planning and bargaining 
To be effective, plans must be implemented. 
On the other hand, it is clear that there will be 
conflicting interests in the planning process. To 
achieve coherence of the kind which cannot now 
be achieved by the market, the process of plan-
ning must itself involve a trade-off between dif-
ferent social groups and classes. 
In fact, such a process of trade-offs and bar-
gaining would amount in a very real sense to a 
re-introduction of the process of pluralism into 
the modern economy; for, in reality, we no 
longer live in a market system. Contemporary 
capitalist economy is dominated by a few, power-
ful interest groups, concentrated in the privi-
leged relationship between big business and the 
State. This "administered" market was recog-
nized in a prior form by Galbraith under the title 
of "the planning system". In reality, however, 
the big business component in this system can-
not plan, because of the crisis of accumulation 
and sales and because both government and the 
unions have been pushed to the sidelines of the 
decision-making process. Hence, big business, 
the unions and government "bargain", but they 
do so without a strategic planning framework. 
Planning and the unions 
It also is clear that the new dimension of 
planning made possible by a new model of devel-
opment implies major change for trade unions. 
If trade unions choose to stay mainly within the 
framework of traditional collective bargaining 
on wages and working conditions, they either 
will not be willing ot will be unable to take part 
in the new planning process and the overall 
allocation of resources in society. Clearly, this 
implies a new challenge and new responsibility 
for unions. Many unions fear incorporation into 
the system if they fake part in such new planning 
procedures. On the other hand, unions cannot 
avoid the crisis and its consequences by standing 
outside the new bargaining process. By so doing, 
they would be observers and victims rather than 
actors and gainers. Without them, the new plan-
ning would not be democratic, nor would it be 
likely to shift resources in favour of working 
people. 
Planning and consumers 
A new planning system would require bar-
gaining not only by producers but also by consu-
mers. So far, the mass production and 
consumption system has relegated the consumer 
movement and its pressure groups to the role of 
protesting about the quality of products, rather 
than about their price, the market which they 
serve or their role in the allocation of resources. 
In this sense the consumer is the victim rather 
than victor of the present system. The contrast is 
not only between the sovereignty of the consu-
mer and producer, but also between the myth of 
the market and the inability of the consumer to 
control the goods and services which the market 
allegedly supplies. 
In a process of systematic and democratic 
planning, the State no longer should pretend to 
represent the consumer. To countervail the 
present forces, a transformation of the role of 
the consumer is imperative. In effect, this means 
a new and enlarged role for the consumer in the 
bargaining process as it relates to the use of 
resources in society, i.e., within the democratic 
planning process. 
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Planning-by-agreement 
New dimensions have been added to the 
possibility of effective planning in the sector of 
big business by the emergence of parallel or 
convergent policies in some of the key parties of 
the Left in Europe and in trade unions in Austra-
lia and the United States. 
Planning agreements have been official 
Labour Party policy since 1973- A similar policy 
was stated in the Projet Socialiste of the French 
Socialist Party as "the main plank" of its indus-
trial policy, and in June 1982 the French govern-
ment introduced its Contrats de Plan, covering 
both the public sector and private enterprises 
receiving significant State aid. The Flemish 
Socialist Party in Belgium has been given serious 
consideration to the adoption of Accords de 
Planification. The Australian trade unions, in 
association with the labour administrations of 
state governments, has been pursuing the same 
policy. In Greece, PASOK has joined this trend 
with a policy of the same name, which was 
announced by the Prime Minister in September 
1982. 
In Italy, a policy similar to that of planning 
agreements was pursued under the Centre Left 
government beginning in the late 1960s under 
the name of "programme contracts" (Contratta-
zione Programmata). Planning agreements also 
have recently been re-introduced for major 
investment projects in the South. In Belgium, 
legislation for such a programme contract {Con-
trat de Programme) was introduced in 1971 as a 
result of pressure brought by the Socialists, who 
were in the government at that time. In Portu-
gal, too, legislation was introduced by the Social-
ist government for a programme contract policy. 
Internationally, some leading trade unions, 
such as the International Metalworkers Federa-
tion, have recently recommended the introduc-
tion of planning agreement negotiations 
(International Metalworkers Federation, 1982). 
It has to be stressed that previous policies of 
bilateral contractual planning between govern-
ment and business have not been uniformly suc-
cessful. In some cases they have been clearly 
unsuccessful and have failed to achieve any 
major change in the balance of public and private 
power. However, a key element in such policies 
has been the voluntary nature of the agreements. 
Belgian planners in the early 1970s were well 
aware that the agreements which they nego-
tiated with companies such as Siemens and Phil-
lips ran the risk of being no more than public 
relations exercises with the companies con-
cerned, which could appear to be co-operating 
with the public interest while in fact being only 
minimally influenced by the agreements in 
question. 
It also is arguable, however, that the bilateral 
planning approach has so far been limited not 
only because it has not been open to involvement 
by trade unions but also because it has not been 
given a central role in the planning process. By 
and large it is still being undertaken only within 
a sectoral or microeconomic framework. It has 
thus tended to respond to problems at the level 
of individual firms and industries. 
Planning potential 
If a planning agreement approach is to real-
ize its potential, it must conciously aim to relate 
macroeconomic targets and policies with 
changes in the behaviour of mesoeconomic big 
business. The error of conventional macroeco-
nomic policy has not been in its aim of changing 
aggregate performance, but in the means which 
it has adopted to accomplish it. The lengthened 
planning cycle of big business associated with 
larger-scale and technically more advanced pro-
jects is now as long or longer than the term of 
most governments, and certainly longer than 
individual budgets. Similarly, national policies 
for the macroeconomy are profoundly influ-
enced both by the international environment 
and the global range of transnational companies. 
In this sense, no policy of planning for 
change can be effective without a reflationary 
macroeconomic policy. Planning agreements at 
the level of individual firms can complement but 
not substitute for macroeconomic policy. 
It also has been stressed that the rise of 
multinational big business is now divorced from 
both the Keynesian and monetarist macro-micro 
synthesis. 
Therefore, planning-by-agreement at the 
level of big business must relate to the following 
key macroeconomic variables: 
Prices, productivity and profits (rate of 
return) 
Output 
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Employment 
Trade (including trade with subsidiaries) 
Investment 
Consumption 
Such a policy within a planning agreement 
framework should also be able to take account of 
three main aspects of distribution which have 
been examined earlier in this article: 
— Structural (between sectors and firms) 
— Social (between economic groups and social 
classes) 
— Spatial (between regions and urban areas). 
Accounting and accountability 
If this heading appears ambitious, account 
should be taken of the small number of firms 
which now dominate the macroeconomy in any 
European country. A mere 140 companies 
already command one-third of the GDP of the 
European Community. In practice, between 100 
and 150 companies tend' to represent half or 
more of the main sectors of activity in a typical 
European economy. What they do at the structu-
ral level dominates not only macroeconomic 
aggregates but also the social and spatial distri-
bution of activity. In turn, as has been recognized 
for decades by standard oligopoly theory, leading 
firms in the system dominate the microeco-
nomic sector of smaller national, regional and 
local firms. 
Technically, there are major gains to be 
made by introducing a mesoeconomic dimension 
to both national and international accounting. 
Because leading enterprises are now so multina-
tional, national figures concerning concentra-
tion are closely related to international 
concentration (e.g., the 140 companies now 
accounting for one-third of the EEC gross 
domestic product). Requiring leading firms to 
report on both their actual activity and their 
intended policy in terms of standard accounting 
categories could provide a new transparency to 
the present opaque future. Thus information on 
the intended activity of a few dozen firms could 
give a government the basis for transforming 
macroeconomic performance through the meso-
economic sector. 
Such a data base from a very few firms could 
easily be related to input-output techniques. 
Data could be collated on the basis of one or a 
combination of three main criteria: i) firm con-
centration ratios; Ü) those firms representing 
the upper half of the sector; and iii) firms with 
more than a given turnover per annum. Firms 
also could be required to submit further informa-
tion within the context of a specific planning 
agreement. This is .no more than the range of 
data required in Belgium under the programme 
contracts procedure, but it should be more syste-
matic and more closely related to both macro and 
microeconomic structures. 
The links between the mesoeconomic and 
microeconomic sectors could be traced through 
the information supplied by leading firms in the 
planning agreement sector. T h^is is the signifi-
cance of the information on "buyers and suppli-
ers" which should be required from leading 
firms. Information on social distribution (by 
wage, skill, sex), is, in principle, not difficult to 
obtain. Spatial distribution of the investment 
and employment of the subsidiaries and plants 
of mesoeconomic enterprise could contribute to 
the formulation of a socio-spatial "map" of the 
dominant enterprises in the system. 
Public and private power 
Technical progress and new technologies 
such as word and data processors and robotics 
imply considerable net unemployment when a 
model of private capitalist growth is projected 
into the future. Moreover, such growth will be 
partial and unequal ¡n its distribution; it will 
benefit only certain social groups and classes and 
limited regions and areas. 
As already stressed, if a new model of devel-
opment is to displace monetarism on the Euro-
pean agenda, a major shift will have to take place 
from private to social consumption. The produc-
tivity of new technologies will need to be redis-
tributed in the three main senses already 
described, i.e.: i) structurally (between firms and 
sectors); ¡i) socially (between different groups 
and classes); and ¡ii) spatially (between different 
areas and regions). 
Macroeconomic fiscal policy clearly will have 
a key and continuing role to play in this process. 
The main beneficiaries of the new technologies, 
however, will be the leading firms in the meso-
economic sector (either directly —since their 
scale alone can justify the investment expendi-
tures involved— or indirectly through gains 
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from raised productivity in supplying firms). 
New forms of taxation will need to be considered 
in relation to big business in order to avoid the 
under-reporting of profits through transfer pric-
ing. This kind of tax liability can only be effective 
if it is negotiated directly with the individual 
companies through a planning agreement 
procedure. Such a policy would result in con-
straints on big business and would involve 
government sanctions for non-co-operation or 
blatant disregard of the public interest. 
If by these means the State were to advance 
beyond indicative planning, it should reserve the 
right to block any mesoeconomic enterprise 
from receiving: i) public contracts; ii) public aid; 
or iii) exemptions from general price controls 
unless it negotiated a planning agreement. 
Clearly, these three factors of public spending, 
public subsidy and price controls are potentially 
powerful combinations of incentives and con-
straints on the private sector. 
The counterpart to the above contraints is 
planning through the extension of the public 
sector. Clearly in the European Left this ranges 
from the major commitments to extension made 
by the socialist Party in France to the commit-
ment to democratize the existing public sector 
made by the Communist Party in Italy. Broadly, 
the extension of the public enterprise sector can 
be seen as a direct measure "pushing" invest-
ment, employment, emplacement, etc, against 
the indirect "pull" of planning agreement poli-
cies relating to the private sector of big business. 
The recent experience under the Socialist 
government in France of placing leading firms 
under State ownership should not be seen as a 
refutation of this potential. Deflationary mea-
sures introduced by the government in response 
to international speculative pressure against the 
franc nonetheless exempted key investment 
modernization programmes, and more than half 
of this increase in investment was undertaken by 
existing and new public enterprise groups over a 
period of five years. 
Thus, in the heartland of the Western Euro-
pean economies there are new dimensions for 
reconciling effective strategic planning with 
highly evolved tactical decision-making in enter-
prise. This process should involve joint negotia-
tion, through planning agreements, among 
representatives of government, the unions and 
management (whether that management 
remains conventional or is worker-elected). 
Such a tripartite formula makes feasible a recon-
ciliation of the public interest of society as a 
whole with the economic interest of viable 
enterprises in the sector. 
Joint negotiation 
Joint negotiation offers the potential for 
three major dimensions in democratic planning: 
i) A fundamental change in the balance of 
power in big business, shifting it away from 
capital and towards labour and governemnt; 
¡i) A framework for the reconciliation of the 
otherwise potentially conflicting interests of 
producers in big business versus producers and 
consumers in general; and 
iii) A framework in which such strategic 
negotiation would avoid both the over-
centralized planning of the controlled econo-
mies and ineffective indicative planning models. 
In addition, it would make possible a higher 
degree of worker self-management and control 
in the vast majority of small and medium sized 
enterprises in the system. In Yugoslavia, decen-
tralization and workers' control have basically 
resulted in a trend towards insufficient strategic 
national planning, with a persistent regional 
imbalance, price inflation and balance-of-
payments problems. However, joint negotiation 
of planning ends and means in the sector of big 
business, through democratic institutions, could 
leave some 99% of the enterprises free, within 
general guidelines, to undertake their own allo-
cation of resources without direct central inter-
vention in specific cases. 
If such democratic planning is to prove effec-
tive in mobilizing economic resources in the 
public interest, it will need a framework for the 
process of planning as social negotiation. If we 
are to avoid authoritarian or technocratic plan-
ning imposed from above, it also must transform 
the previous rigid five-year planning framework 
which has predominated in both Eastern and 
Western Europe. On the one hand, this frame-
work is too long to permit effective change in 
planning ends and means. Parliaments thus 
have a chance only twice in a decade to comment 
on plans after they have already been formulated 
in detail in the seclusion of finance, industry and 
planning departments. Yet such five-year plans 
do not have a sufficiently long-time horizon to 
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project changes in the overall structure of the 
economy and society. As a result, their frame-
work tends to reinforce pseudo-planning which 
amounts to an exhortation to make the prevail-
ing system work at higher levels of output. 
Alternative plans 
Recognition of the new dominance of big 
business in the contemporary economy provides 
the basis for a democratic planning framework. 
Such large-scale enterprises, with few excep-
tions, employ an internal five-year planning 
horizon. These firms tend to employ technology 
and innovation perspectives of up to ten years or 
more, while they actually adapt their investment 
plans on an annual or less-than-annual basis. In 
this way their corporate planning, based on pri-
vate criteria, amounts to a rolling, ongoing five-
year plan which is adapted annually, with a 
longer forecasting and technology perspective. 
Facilities and funds should increasingly be 
made available to trade unions to allow them to 
propose and develop alternative corporate plans 
with different options and criteria from those of 
the private sector. The feasibility of such alterna-
tive plans has been demonstrated in several 
companies including, most notably, in the Lucas 
Aerospace Combine Committee's proposals for 
a range of products in the "life industry" of 
health, safety and transport, as against the 
"death industry" of defence. 
Private corporate planning in big business 
should be transformed under such a process of 
democratic planning. Big business normally 
undertakes a review of the previous year's results 
in the spring of the following year and on annual 
preview (frequently in the autumn) of the com-
ing year's prospects. This biannual adaptability 
could be socialized on the basis of the tripartite 
principle of involving both the public authorities 
and the unions in the negotiation of changes in 
corporate planning in the mesoeconomic sector 
on a similar time schedule. This is perfectly 
feasible in a situation where only a few dozen 
enterprises in the main Western European econ-
omies account for around one-half of national 
investment, output and trade. 
Similarly, there is no reason why parlia-
ments should not be involved in national debates 
twice a year concerning the results of tripartite 
negotiations in the public and private mesoeco-
nomic sectors. Such an ongoing process of nego-
tiated planning would place parliamentarians in 
an informed position from which to pressure for 
further change in the aims and methods of plan-
ning itself. 
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